

All You Can Eat – Breaking a Real-World Contactless Payment System

Kasper, Silbermann and Paar, Comment by Friedrich Ellmer

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
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Brief Content



- Authors were able to change amount of money on every card
- They did not find any check for card number and balance
- Typical example of secret encryption mechanism (c.f. Lampson)



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Pros & Cons

What's good?

- Real world case
- no ivory tower research

What's bad?

- What's not mentioned:
 - This payment system is **not** wide spread
 - the owner is written on the card and can't be changed!
 - No solution provided
- It has been tested only with small values (below tolerance threshold?)

Is this enough?



- Security is always a trade-off between effort and protection
 - at least at the bank's side
- Complete security is never possible
- \rightarrow You have to choose the security level wisely
 - Otherwise too much effort required or insufficient protection

Is this security level high enough for a micro payment system?