@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/esorics/WangLC08,
  author    = {Qihua Wang and
               Ninghui Li and
               Hong Chen},
  title     = {On the Security of Delegation in Access Control 	Systems},
  booktitle = {ESORICS},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {317-332},
  ee        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_21},
  crossref  = {DBLP:conf/esorics/2008},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de} }

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/esorics/2008,
  editor    = {Sushil Jajodia and
               Javier L{\'o}pez},
  title     = {Computer Security - ESORICS 2008, 13th European 	Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 
	M{\'a}laga, Spain, October 6-8, 2008. Proceedings},
  booktitle = {ESORICS},
  publisher = {Springer},
  series    = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume    = {5283},
  year      = {2008},
  isbn      = {978-3-540-88312-8},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de} }


On the Security of Delegation in Access Control Systems 
Book Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
Publisher Springer Berlin / Heidelberg 
ISSN 0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online) Volume 
Volume 5283/2008 
Book Computer Security - ESORICS 2008 DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5 
Copyright 2008 
ISBN 978-3-540-88312-8 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_21 
Pages 317-332 
Subject Collection Computer Science 
SpringerLink Date Sunday, October 05, 2008  

On the Security of Delegation in Access Control Systems 
Qihua Wang, Ninghui Li, and Hong Chen

Abstract

Delegation is a mechanism that allows a user A to act on another user
B's behalf by making B's access rights available to A. It is well
recognized as an important mechanism to provide resiliency and
flexibility in access control systems, and has gained popularity in
the research community.  However, most existing literature focuses on
modeling and managing delegations. Little work has been done on
understanding the impact of delegation on the security of existing
access control systems. In particular, no formal notion of security
with respect to delegation has been proposed.  Many existing access
control systems are designed without having delegation in mind. Simply
incorporating a delegation module into those systems may cause
security breaches.  This paper focuses on the security aspect of
delegation in access control systems. We first give examples on how
colluding users may abuse the delegation support of access control
systems to circumvent security policies, such as separation of
duty. As a major contribution, we propose a formal notion of security
with respect to delegation in access control systems. After that, we
discuss potential mechanisms to enforce security. In particular, we
design a novel source-based enforcement mechanism for workflow
authorization systems so as to achieve both security and efficiency.