@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/fc/MillerMF00,
  author    = {Mark S. Miller and
               Chip Morningstar and
               Bill Frantz},
  title     = {Capability-Based Financial Instruments},
  booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
  year      = {2000},
  pages     = {349-378},
  ee        =
{http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/1962/19620349.htm},
  crossref  = {DBLP:conf/fc/2000},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de} }

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/fc/2000,
  editor    = {Yair Frankel},
  title     = {Financial Cryptography, 4th International Conference, FC
               2000 Anguilla, British West Indies, February 20-24, 2000,
               Proceedings},
  booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
  publisher = {Springer},
  series    = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume    = {1962},
  year      = {2001},
  isbn      = {3-540-42700-7},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de} }


Capability-Based Financial Instruments 
Mark S. Miller , Chip Morningstar, Bill Frantz 
Book Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
Publisher Springer Berlin / Heidelberg 
ISSN 0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online) 
Volume Volume 1962/2001 
Book Financial Cryptography 
DOI 10.1007/3-540-45472-1 
Copyright 2001 
ISBN 978-3-540-42700-1 
DOI 10.1007/3-540-45472-1_24 
Pages 349-378 
Subject Collection Computer Science 
SpringerLink Date Monday, January 01, 2001 

Abstract

Every novel cooperative arrangement of mutually suspicious parties
interacting electronically - every smart contract - effectively
requires a new cryptographic protocol. However, if every new contract
requires new cryptographic protocol design, our dreams of
cryptographically enabled electronic commerce would be
unreachable. Cryptographic protocol design is too hard and expensive,
given our unlimited need for new contracts.  Just as the digital logic
gate abstraction allows digital circuit designers to create large
analog circuits without doing analog circuit design, we present
cryptographic capabilities as an abstraction allowing a similar
economy of engineering effort in creating smart contracts. We explain
the E system, which embodies these principles, and show a
covered-call-option as a smart contract written in a simple security
formalism independent of cryptography, but automatically implemented
as a cryptographic protocol coordinating five mutually suspicious
parties.