

"Architecture for Protecting Critical Secrets in Microprocessors"

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Summary

- ▶ Secrets? Keys.
- ▶ Protecting? Threat model:
 - ▶ Key exposure or tampering via...
 - ▶ Software attacks – including OS (ring 0)
 - ▶ Some hardware attacks – bus/memory/disk data snooping or tampering.
- ▶ Architecture? “Virtual Secure Co-Processor”



Secrets

- ▶ **User Keychain**

- ▶ Tree of keys, each child encrypted by its parent.
- ▶ Leaf keys can be used to protect external data – email, VoIP, ...
- ▶ Root is...

- ▶ **User Master Key**

- ▶ E.g. cryptographically strong hash of a passphrase.
- ▶ Entered by user via secure I/O path.

- ▶ **Device Master Key**

- ▶ Protects TSM code and data.
- ▶ Stored in non-volatile memory.
- ▶ Created at init time; readable only by CPU's AES hardware.



Architecture

- ▶ **Minimal trusted components:**
 - ▶ Hardware
 - ▶ CPU, cache, AES, secure I/O.
 - ▶ Software
 - ▶ Trusted Software Module.
- ▶ **TSM executes in Concealed Execution Mode.**
- ▶ **Code and data protected by Device Master Key:**
 - ▶ Icache lines are signed in code stream; verified and tagged on load.
 - ▶ Dcache lines are encrypted and signed; decrypted, verified, and tagged on load; encrypted and signed on eviction.
 - ▶ Register file encrypted, signed and stored in-place on interrupt; OS handler requires no modification.



Security Analysis

- ▶ Protecting keys from hostile software? Done.
- ▶ Protecting USE of keys by hostile software? Not in scope.
 - ▶ Though suggestions given: verified OS kernel, secure boot, ...
- ▶ Protecting users from hostile second-parties? ...
 - ▶ Hardware owner – ‘Secure I/O’? Nope.
 - ▶ TSM vendor? DMK read-only, TSM outside OS access model.
 - ▶ Hardware vendor?



Security Analysis, cont.

- ▶ **No factory-installed code or secrets.**
 - ▶ “...protected from compromise of the factory and its secrets database.”
 - ▶ Cryptographic root of trust known to user.
- ▶ **No facility for attestation; user-installed TSM.**
 - ▶ Software root of trust specified by user.
- ▶ **Compare & contrast.**



Questions?

