On the (Im)possibility of Obfuscating Programs

A discussion of the 2001 paper by Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang.

> Presented by Nicolai Moles-Benfell. CS725

Summary of results

- Barak *et al* 2001 paper is a theoretical proof of the impossibility of a perfect obfuscator capable of obfuscating all Turing machines (programs).
- Their proof relies
 - On the existence of one way functions.
 - And their model and definition of an obfuscator.

What is Obfuscation?

- An obfuscator is an algorithm that can be viewed as a compiler, that takes a program P as input and ouput's a different program O(P).
- Generally the goal of O(P) is to make understanding P difficult and/or time consuming.
- Barak *et al* chose a stricter definition of obfuscation:
 - O(P) should behave as a black box.
 - No information about P should be learnable from O(P), except that which is observable from studying the Input/Output of O(P).
 - O(P) should have approximately the same functionality and time complexity (running time) as P.



 \rightarrow = observable behavior/properties

Programs have observable properties, some are important others are not, a black box obfuscator would hides all properties and behavior.
By adopting the black box model it is then possible to prove the <u>absolute</u> security of a obfuscation scheme.

One way functions



- Unless the party computing the inverse of the problem has additional information specific to the problem, a 'trap door'.
- A trap door allows the inverse of the problem to be easily computed.

Barak et al Main Results

- Outline of their proof:
 - They show that if one-way functions exist then there exists programs that can not be obfuscated.
- Why ?
 - Let P compute the inverse of a one-way function, with the use of a trap door.
 - Then the trap door (a hard coded value) is a distinctive property of P, that the obfuscator would need to remove from O(P).
 - But by removing it,
 - O(P) is no longer able to efficiently compute the inverse of the problem
 - therefore does not have the same functionality as P, and fails to meet Barak's definition of an obfuscator.
- Therefore universal (black box) obfuscators can not exist.

Appreciative Comment?

- Barak *et al* describe a number of interesting applications of a black box obfuscator (if it were to exist).
- For Example:
 - Transforming Private key encryption into Public key encryption (secure Digital Rights management)

Private Key Cryptography

- Private Key cryptography is computationally inexpensive
- -Security (should be) dependent on the secrecy of the key.
- **But** need a method to securely share the key with other parties.



Public Key Cryptography

- Public Key cryptography is computational expensive, and employees one-way functions.
- And uses two keys, one public and the other private.
- The public key is published so anyone can encrypt data, but only the trapdoor (the secret key) can be used to decrypt.



Digital Rights management

- If a Black Box Obfuscator existed, then hardwire the secret key into decryption algorithm of a *private key cipher*, and obfuscate the two, to create $O(P_K)$
- Why?
 - Because By encrypting the digital media with a customers private key, only the obfuscated program $O(P_{K})$ can be used to view the media.



Critical Thoughts

- On face value these results appear disappointing for software obfuscation.
- But they arise from defining and modeling obfuscation as a <u>black box</u>.
- The impossibility of a universal black box obfuscator limits some theoretical applications.
- But in practice several more important questions araise
 - What proportion (or class) of programs do the results apply to?
 - Is there a more practical model of obfuscation then the Black box paradigm? For example that might allow non sensitive information to be leaked from the obfuscated code?

The other Appreciative Comment

 Barak *et al* point out that their approach to obfuscation is theoretical, there might exist heuristically strong methods for commercial use!

Questions

2