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https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-591.pdf

In this paper we discuss the analysis of trusted platform communication.
While the trusted platform module itself is considered reasonably tamper resistant,
the communication channel between this module and the rest of the trusted platform
turns out to be comparatively insecure. Passive attacks can be mounted on the com-
munication interface with fairly inexpensive equipment and allow eavesdropping of
critical information. Performing active manipulation on the communication bus could
provide an even stronger attack scenario, resulting in a circumvention of the whole
chain of trust provided by trusted platforms. At this stage, our research has been
limited to passive attacks.