


Extensible Security Architectures for Java



"... [With] software-based protection we can allow for more extensible security models ..."

Written by D Wallach etl-all

Presented by David Waters

20/09/00

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Goals

- To find extensible security systems
- That uses Software-based Methodologies
- And the Secure Services concept




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Paper Overview

- Mobile code needs flexible security
 - Software based vs. hardware based methods
 - Memory protection vs. secure services
 - Possible solutions
 - Capabilities
 - Stack introspection
 - Namespace management
 - Evaluation
 - Criteria
 - Results
- 
- My Focus

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Current Environment(Java)

- Trusted/untrusted (local/remote) code can co-exist on the same JVM (and call each other).
- Java must be able to determine who initiated this call.
 - Reference to its ClassLoader.
 - Frame stack has reference to thread.
 - These combined mean that Java can search for remote code on the call stack.
- The security manager does just that.(Badly)

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
Capabilities

- Based on unforgeable references to a controlled resource.
 - "Any program which has a capability must have been permitted to use it."
- Programmes must explicitly request a capability to gain access.
 - (A good way of doing this in Java is through the factory pattern).
- Non-public Constructors.

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Capabilities



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
Extended Stack Introspection.

- (Used by both Netscape 4+ and IE 4+).
- Based on Simple Stack Introspection.
- Privileges created in the stack frame.
- Standard calls.
 - To get access.
 - Client call enablePrivilege.
 - Service calls checkPrivilege.
 - Client calls disablePrivilege when done.

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Extended Stack Introspection.



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Name Space Management

- Achieves security by showing/hiding/substituting all sensitive classes.
- This is done by replacing the class loader with one that maps (principles, class requested) → (class they are allowed to access).

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Name Space Management

<i>Class Requested/ Principle</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>IBM</i>	<i>David</i>
<i>Java.net.socket</i>	Nil	Security.io.Socket	Java.net.Socket
<i>Java.io.file</i>	Nil	Security.io.file	Java.io.File
<i>Java.net.server Socket</i>	Nil	Nil	Java.net.Server Socket

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Comparison

	<i>Extended Stack Inspection</i>	<i>Capabilites</i>	<i>Name Space Management</i>
<i>Exsisting Code Changes (User level)</i>	Nil	Some	Nil
<i>(System Level)</i>	Some	Extensive	Some
<i>(Kernel [JVM])</i>	Nil	Nil	Some
<i>Run time Panilties</i>	Minimal	EvenLess	None(some load time)
<i>New Code Changes (UserLevel)</i>	Minimal	Some	Nil

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Questions??????

- What is wrong with the SandBox?
- Allow multiple signatures?
- How to resolve permissions?
- Are our choices now going to limit what can be done in the future?
- Which of the possible solutions is best?

